Introduction
The United States is a member of six international financial institutions: the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB). Since 1945, the United States has contributed about $98 billion to these institutions, and has pledged another $97 billion in callable capital.
1 Established by international agreements, the IFIs are embedded in the legal systems of each member nation.
In the United States, the governing law is the Bretton Woods Agreement Act, first passed by congress in 1945 and subsequently amended. This law stipulates that congress must give its consent before the United States takes part in any new IFI funding agreements. While United
States executive branch officials are powerful actors within the IFIs, members of congress control U.S. appropriations for these institutions.
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I analyze the choices of these political actors, because they have power over U.S. policy toward the IFIs. Specifically, I examine how members of congress vote on legislation to replenish the funds of the IFIs. The floor votes I explore represent the universe of bills and amendments in the House of Representatives that focus exclusively on funding the IFIs. 3 There were five such votes between 1977 and 1998. Three of these votes related to funding the IMF, 1 Callable capital is a legal obligation of the United States, to be exercised only if an IFI goes bankrupt and needs to pay off its bondholders. Only about 12 percent of the total callable capital has been appropriated. See Sanford (2005) . 2 The executive branch negotiates with other IFI members regarding the size and share of the U.S. contribution prior to the commencement of the congressional authorization process, and the negotiated agreements are usually presented to the Congress in completed form.
3 Congress usually considers IFI funding increases in the context of large spending bills. On five occasions, however, members voted on amendemts, motions, or bills that considered the IFI component separately from other allocations.
one vote targeted the appropriation of funds for the World Bank, and one vote simultaneously funded the World Bank, its agencies, and the AsDB. Table 1 provides a summary of these votes.
Voting for an IFI funding increase is a transparent signal of support for these institutions as it increases the resources the organizations have for their lending activities. My aim is to explain why some members of congress vote in favor of such increases while others vote against them. My arguments and evidence suggest that member voting is responsive to personal ideology, interest group influences and, to a lesser degree, district characteristics. I find that ideology has the largest impact on how members vote on IFI funding increases. Members with conservative beliefs tend to view international institutions like the IMF and World Bank as remote and opaque bureaucracies that engage in wasteful interventions in the marketplace. I use "Nominate" measures of member ideology from Poole and Rosenthal (1997) to estimate the effect of conservative beliefs and find that a 1 standard deviation increase in conservatism decreases the likelihood that a member will vote for a funding increase by 38 percentage points, on average (32 points for Democrats; 44 points for Republicans). The implication is that a more conservative U.S. congress is likely to be a greater hurdle to funding the IFIs than a liberal one.
As for interest group effects, I focus on campaign contributions from "money center"
banks: large, commercial banks in financial centers like New York, Chicago, and San Francisco that specialize in international lending. 4 These banks have a special interest in supporting the IFIs -and the IMF in particular -because well funded IFIs mitigate the risks and promote the opportunities of lending to developing countries. If, for example, the IMF can help rescue countries when they face an economic crisis, there is a better chance that such countries will not default on loans they owe to these banks. I find that members of congress that receive larger shares of contributions from money center banks are more likely to vote in favor of increasing the U.S. contribution to the IFIs. The effect is not trivial. A 1 standard deviation increase in contributions from internationally oriented banks increases the likelihood that a member will vote for a funding increase by 10 percentage points, on average (12 points for Democrats; 8 points for Republicans). The implication is that a powerful lobby stands behind U.S.
participation in the IFIs.
I also test to see if members of congress are responsive to the preferences of unorganized constituencies in their districts. I argue that constituents view the IFIs as forces for global economic integration which, from the Stolper-Samuelson perspective, is good for high-skilled workers in the United States, but bad for low-skilled workers, who must compete with the lowskilled workers in developing countries. Alternatively, the Ricardo-Viner approach suggests that constituent divisions should fall along industry lines, with workers employed in importcompeting industries opposing the IFIs globalizing policies, and workers involved in exporting industries favoring them. While I find some support for these effects in votes that occurred in 1977, 1980, and 1983 , there is no evidence that members voted on this basis in the 1990s.
The effects of ideology and campaign contributions from banks are impressively large and statistically significant, even when I control for political party (which is important because
Republicans typically oppose contributions to the IFIs, while Democrats have by and large supported them) and district income (on the grounds that IFI mandates to promote globalization and economic development are normal goods which people consume more of as they get wealthier). The strength of these findings suggests that the United States does not act as a singular entity regarding the IFIs. While there are members within congress that are obstacles to funding increases for the IFIs, there are also members that are allies of these institutions -those who want to give the IFIs more resources and more authority to stabilize world financial markets and to promote economic development. I examine the battle that occurs at the congressional level because, depending upon who wins it, congress can be just as much an ally as an obstacle to the IFIs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide a summary of the functions and organization of the IFIs, emphasizing their funding arrangements and the role of congress.
Section 3 contains my arguments and evidentiary strategy, and Section 4 is the empirical analysis of congressional roll-call votes. The final section is the conclusion, which discusses implications.
Functions and Funding of the IFIs: The Role of Congress
The functions of the IFIs fall into two distinct categories: balance of payments financing and long-term development assistance. These functions reflect the division of labor between the IMF and the World Bank at their founding in 1945 (Horsefield 1969) . The IMF's mandate was to support global trade and economic growth by providing assistance to countries facing balanceof-payments difficulties. IMF loans enable countries to rebuild their reserves, stabilize their currencies, and continue paying for imports, while they adjust policies and make reforms to correct their payments problems. 5 The principal function of the World Bank was to provide 5 There are two main components to IMF programs-financing and conditionality. Access to, and disbursement of, IMF finance, is conditioned on the adoption of policy measures negotiated by the IMF with the recipient country. This "conditionality," usually takes the form of performance criteria (e.g., inflation and spending targets) and policy benchmarks (e.g. trade development loans for projects that were too large or too risky for private banks to finance. The roll call votes on this legislation provide an opportunity to estimate the covariates of member support for the IFIs. They are "clean" votes, in the sense that a vote for or against captures a member's position on increasing U.S. contributions to the IFIs. Table 1 provides a summary of these votes.
Approach and Arguments
Which members of congress will vote in favor of IFI funding increases? Which will vote against? Legislator positions are influenced by many factors, including partisan identity and expectations about the future consequences of IFI policies (such as the moral hazard problem associated with IMF bailouts). I assume legislator behavior is partly self-interested and driven by the desire to remain in office. However, because IFI policy is not a "high salience issue" (of concern to most voters, most of the time), legislators should have some flexibility to vote on the basis of their personal convictions -legislator "ideology" should be important to legislators' voting decisions. While factors that affect a member's re-election prospects should also matter, personal ideology should have a large impact because the average citizen is not likely to be aware of the content or existence of most IFI-related legislation. This lack of knowledge implies, following the "salience hypothesis," that legislators need not be perfect agents of constituent preferences -they will have room to vote their personal beliefs (Miller and Stokes 1963) . What then shapes legislator beliefs about the IMF?
I argue that ideology provides legislators with a simple schema for evaluating votes on funding the IFIs. Indeed, almost all issues in congress fall on a single liberal-conservative dimension epitomized by the role of government in the economy (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) .
Funding the IMF and World Bank should be no different. Conservative politicians that believe in a small role for government regulation of the domestic economy should oppose financing the IFIs because IFI programs distort economic incentives in the global economy. For example, many conservatives see IMF programs as "bailouts" that insulate investors and borrowers from the risks of their actions and thereby promote greater instability in international finance.
Conservatives also oppose the expansion of the government sector and see international organizations like the IMF as particular prone to waste and inefficiency.
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Conversely, liberals focus on market failures at both the domestic and the international levels and see a positive role for IFIs in mitigating the economic and social costs of financial and development crises. They also tend to be more optimistic about the operations of international organizations, and the motivations of the officials that inhabit them. 13 In short, ideology provides the foundation upon which legislators evaluate the IFIs. While such ideologically driven beliefs should influence positions on the IFIs, legislators are not completely unrestrained by constituent and interest groups pressures. To some degree, they must also consider how IFI funding will affect them electorally. This means they have to be responsive to the preferences of voters and special interest groups. To derive these preferences, I
ask: who benefits and who loses from IFI policies? I look to the economics literature on economic globalization to derive such distributional effects.
With respect to voter preferences, I expect members representing districts with greater proportions of net "winners" from economic globalization to be more likely to favor increasing the IFI's resources. This is because the IFI's, by pursuing its mandate to promote and protect the world economy, encourages globalization and its attendant distributional consequences (Woods 2006) . Two models from trade theory identify the winners and losers of the IFIs proglobalization policies.
The Ricardo-Viner model assumes that factors of production are stuck in their current industry, due to high costs of exit (e.g., relocation, retooling, and retaining costs). This implies that the incomes of all factor owners in an industry rise or fall together. When an export industry expands due to trade, the need for these industry specific factors expands as well, and they become more valuable. Their owners therefore gain. But, for industries that contract due to import competition, the owners of specific factors find their skills or their property obsolete, and they may suffer a significant loss of real income. In short, the divisions on globalization fall along industry lines, with workers and owners in export industries gaining while workers and owners in import-competing industries lose. Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and Mundell (1957) identified globalization's winners and losers from a model in which factors of production are assumed to be freely mobile across industries. This yields the prediction that owners of locally abundant factors tend to gain more than average from globalization, while owners of scarce factors tend to lose, regardless of the sector in which they are employed. In the United States, the relatively scarce factor is lowskilled labor, and thus the group most likely to lose from globalization is low-skilled labor (Wood 1994) . As trade has increased with nations where low-skilled labor is relatively abundant Inasmuch as legislators evaluate the distributional effects of a policy on voting constituencies within their districts and take positions that reflect these interests, diffuse interests such as high-and low-skilled workers or workers in import-competing and export industries, may still find their interests expressed in the electoral calculations of legislators (Bailey 2001; Arnold 1992; Denzau and Munger 1986) . These calculations can occur even in the absence of direct influence and lobbying, meaning that diffuse interests don't actually have to organize for this mechanism to be effective.
Among organized interest groups, money center banks comprise a key constituency for the IFIs. On the one hand, IMF financial rescues provide de facto insurance to these banks, allowing them to retain the gains from international lending while distributing losses, when they occur, to the public sector. On the other, the pro-globalization orientation of the World Bank and other MDBs expand international opportunities for these banks and promote policies in developing countries that are conducive to debt repayment. Thus, I expect campaign contributions from money center banks to have a positive impact on the propensity of a member of congress to vote in favor of increasing U.S. contributions to the IFIs.
Among the IFIs, the IMF is most directly beneficial to these banks. Even if intended to stabilize the international financial system, IMF rescues are a form of insurance for private creditors, and thus a source of moral hazard (Bulow and Rogoff 1990, Rogoff 1999) . Moral hazard arises when the existence of IMF crisis assistance encourages banks to take on risks that they might otherwise shun, in an attempt to reap greater financial returns. Banks may over-lend to emerging economies because of the expectation, based on previous experience, that the IMF will provide the foreign exchange liquidity that will allow them to exit the country in time of crisis, without bearing their full losses. Indeed, Bird (1996: 489) finds that the financial assistance the Fund provides to debtor countries is often used to repay loans to commercial banks. In fact, in some instances, debt service is an explicit component of IMF programs.
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Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1993) also find more general evidence of the benefits moral hazard provides to banks by showing that unanticipated increases in U.S. financial commitments to the IMF cause the stock market capitalization of the exposed banks to increase.
My argument is that commercial banks with assets in developing countries are the most direct beneficiaries of IMF-created moral hazard and therefore likely to give campaign contributions to members of congress that support the IMF. While the activities of the World Bank and other MDBs also benefit international banks, the gains are less direct and work through structural adjustment policies that encourage developing countries to pursue openness to international trade and capital flows.
Data, Models, and Results
I test the three following hypotheses: First, I expect legislators with conservative ideologies to oppose new funding requests for the IFIs. Conservative members oppose increasing the quota because they see the IFIs as opaque, inefficient bureaucracies whose interventions in global financial and development markets are wasteful, distortionary, and a source of moral hazard. Second, I anticipate that the higher the share of voters in a district that benefit from global economic integration, the more likely a member will be to support the IFIs.
The beneficiaries can be defined by industry, following Ricardo-Viner reasoning, or by skill level following Stolper-Samuelson. Either operationalization captures my argument that members of congress understand that the IFIs promote globalization, and take positions that reflect the impact of globalization on the real incomes of constituents. Third, I expect the probability a member will vote in favor of funding the IMF to increase with a member's affinity to money center banks. This affinity is proxied by the amount of campaign contributions each member receives from these banks.
My proxy for legislator ideology is the first dimension of the DW-Nominate score (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) . DW-NOMINATE ranges from -1 to +1, from most liberal to most conservative, and is based on members' voting behavior on issues related to government intervention in the economy. My proxies for the Ricardo-Viner effect of globalization on constituent incomes are NET IMPORTS and NET EXPORTS. NET IMPORTS is the percentage of district workers employed in manufacturing industries where the ratio of imports to consumption is greater that the ratio of revenues from exports to total industry revenue. NET EXPORTS is the percentage of workers in sectors where the ratio of revenues from exports to total industry revenue is greater than the ratio of imports to consumption (see the Appendix for the construction of these variables). To model Stolper-Samuelson effects, which posit a relationship between constituent skill levels and member voting on IFIs, I use COLLEGE, which is the share of district population with four years or more of college.
To identify money center banks, I use the regulatory classification in the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council's (FFIEC) "Country Exposure Lending Survey."
Because the FFIEC identifies the specific banks that comprise the money center group, I was able to obtain a list on which to base the collection of campaign contribution data. 17 An alternate specification of the variable -the unscaled amount of money-center bank contributions to each member -yields nearly identical results.
18 DW-NOMINATE and PARTY are highly correlated at r = .79. Including both variables in Models 2-4 causes PARTY to take a positive value. Coefficient estimates for other variables are robust to excluding PARTY from the models.
IFI development projects in poor countries. The core results are not affected by the inclusion of this control. Table 4 is that COLLEGE is not robust to the inclusion of a control for district income. In Model 6 in both tables, COLLEGE and MEDIAN INCOME are closely correlated (r = .82) and effectively cancel each other out.
As the magnitudes of probit results are difficult to interpret directly, Table 7 provides a substantive interpretation. Using the most complete models from each vote, I simulated the predicted probability of observing a vote in favor of IFI funding for both Democrats and
Republicans, and then examined how these probabilities change as each explanatory variable is increased by 1 standard deviation above its mean. 19 The effects are substantively large. shown that bank campaign contributions are consistently associated with member voting.
Discussion
United States law requires that any increase in U.S. contributions to the IFIs be authorized by Congress. I have analyzed roll-call voting on IFI funding and found that two political factors consistently influence the choices of legislators: (1) Review, where the size of the quota increase was reduced to expedite congressional approval.
In Table 8 , I present slightly more systematic evidence. The table plots the percentage increase in IMF quotas (left axis) from all IMF General Reviews since 1950 against the average ideological position of the U.S. House of Representatives (right axis). 22 DW-Nominate, averaged for all members, proxies for ideology and ranges from -1 (very liberal) to 1 (very conservative). Four General Reviews at the IMF produced "no increase" in quotas: the First (1950), Second (1955 ), Tenth (1995 ), and Twelfth (2003 . Note that these reviews occurred during periods when Congress was markedly conservative. Conversely, the seven large quota increases that occurred between 1960 and 1990 came during liberal Congresses. The only 21 Quota increases" is IMF nomenclature for a new funding plan.
22 During a "General Review of Quotas," which must occur at least every five years, the IMF considers whether to increase funding requirements from member nations. I thank Mark Farrales for suggesting this graph. programs, they communicate directly with IFI officials and staff (Gould 2003 , Oatley 2002 , and Oatley and Yackee 2004 . On matters of funding, they appear to work though Congress, which controls the purse strings.
One potential concern is whether these special interests target members with similar positions, or "buy votes," when they give contributions (Hall and Wayman 1990) . Either way, the money is an observable indication of a relationship in which members are more likely to vote the way banks want. Nevertheless, in Broz (2005) , I find evidence that bank money does influence member voting on international financial rescues provided by the Exchange Stabilization Fund -a similar issue -using a difference-in-difference experiment developed by Stratmann (2002 Notes: Values represent the change in the predicted probability of voting in favor of the IMF/World Bank funding increase as each variable of interest is increased by one standard deviation over its mean, holding other variables at their means. For Democrats, PARTY is held to 100; for Republicans, PARTY is held to 200. Estimates are from the fullest models (Model 4 in Table 2 and Model 6 in Tables 3-6 ). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: DW-NOMINATE (right scale) is the average ideological score of the House of Representatives on the broad issue of government intervention in the economy. Higher values denote a more conservative ideology. IMF quota increases (left scale) are quota increases approved by the IMF's Board of Governors during a General Review of Quotas.
